Mistrial in Lindsay Clancy case reignites debate on maternal mental health laws
The jury in the Lindsay Clancy trial in Massachusetts has failed to reach a verdict after protracted deliberations, prompting the judge to declare a mistrial. The case, which drew international attention, centres on a mother who admitted to killing her three children before attempting to take her own life in 2023. Clancy remains in hospital while prosecutors decide whether to pursue a retrial.
What were the arguments in the Clancy trial?
The prosecution argued the killings were deliberate and calculated, pointing to evidence that Clancy arranged for her husband to be out of the house. A murder conviction would likely result in life imprisonment, as Massachusetts does not apply the death penalty.
The defence maintained that Clancy was suffering from postpartum psychosis at the time and was not in control of her actions. They argued for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, or at worst a manslaughter conviction. Maternal mental health became a central theme of the trial and the wider public debate surrounding it.
How does the Clancy case compare to Lauren Dickason's trial in New Zealand?
The factual similarities between the Clancy case and the 2023 Christchurch trial of Lauren Dickason are striking. Dickason also killed her three children while her husband was absent, then took an overdose. She was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 18 years in prison, with an appeal scheduled for February next year.
In Dickason's trial, the prosecution argued deliberate killing amounting to murder. The defence relied on evidence of major depression and sought a verdict of not guilty due to insanity, but also had an additional legal avenue: infanticide.
What is the separate offence of infanticide?
The availability of an infanticide charge is a key difference between criminal law in Massachusetts and in New Zealand, as well as in Australia, Canada, and England and Wales. Infanticide laws were originally introduced to avoid murder convictions when the death penalty was still in use.
The British parliament passed the Infanticide Act in 1922, replaced by a revised version in 1938. That law remains in force and allows a jury to convict a woman of infanticide rather than murder or manslaughter if she kills her child, the child is under one year old, and a medico-legal test is met. The test asks whether the balance of the mother's mind was disturbed by childbirth or lactation. Sentencing then follows the manslaughter framework, which does not necessarily involve prison. Northern Ireland has a similar provision under its 1939 act.
Infanticide laws spread to parts of the English-speaking world but not to the United States. In Canada, Section 233 of the Criminal Code of 1985 mirrors the English wording, though it applies to a newly-born child and carries a maximum sentence of five years.
Australian examples include Section 6 of the Crimes Act 1958 in Victoria, which covers children up to two years old with a maximum penalty of five years. In New South Wales, Section 22A of the Crimes Act 1900 applies to victims up to 12 months old and uses updated language referring to a mental health impairment consequent on or exacerbated by giving birth. Convictions are sentenced as for manslaughter.
What about diminished responsibility?
Some jurisdictions offer an additional defence called diminished responsibility, which can reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. Scotland, which has no infanticide law, follows this approach. The principle is that mental health difficulties, short of insanity, should be recognised in law and the accused should not be labelled a murderer. These provisions are broader than infanticide because they are not limited to women killing children.
How does New Zealand's infanticide law differ?
New Zealand has taken an independent path. It rejected the general defence of diminished responsibility when drafting the Crimes Act 1961, but adopted a much broader infanticide provision. The law applies to children under ten years old and is not limited to the child whose birth caused the relevant disorder. The maximum sentence is a relatively low three years, making prison less likely.
The law still requires a disturbed balance of mind caused by birth, lactation, or a consequent disorder. The jury must find the disorder severe enough that the woman is not fully responsible.
In the Dickason trial, the jury convicted her of murder, concluding her depression did not meet the New Zealand test for insanity and rejecting the partial defence of infanticide. New Zealand law also allows judges to revisit medical evidence at sentencing to determine whether a life sentence would be manifestly unjust. Justice Mander applied this provision, imposing 18 years instead of life in light of the mental health factors.
Why do these laws matter?
The criminal law rightly treats the deliberate killing of a child with horror, including by a mother. But it must also account for the circumstances of the defendant, since criminal law concerns moral fault, which may vary. Infanticide and diminished-responsibility manslaughter provisions allow juries to calibrate the level of fault.
Such laws should also appeal to those prioritising accountability, even for those who are mentally unwell. They allow a jury to convict a mother of an offence rather than return a not guilty verdict. The Lindsay Clancy trial illustrates how difficult a jury's task becomes when the available options are limited.
This article is republished from The Conversation. It was written by Kris Gledhill, Auckland University of Technology.
Kris Gledhill is a member of the Executive Committee of the Criminal Bar Association and is currently undertaking a criminal justice research project for the Borrin Foundation. The views expressed are his own.