Trump’s Saudi nuclear deal: A strategic shift with global risks

Last week, the Trump administration announced a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, a deal nearly two decades in the making. The announcement came amid the ongoing US-led war with Iran, which was launched to enforce a policy of zero uranium enrichment in that country. The agreement has sparked significant debate among lawmakers, experts, and allies, raising questions about its implications for non-proliferation and regional stability.

Why is the US-Saudi agreement so significant?

The United States currently has 26 nuclear cooperation agreements covering 50 countries, including the 27 member states of the European Atomic Energy Community, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Taiwan. Since the IAEA approved the Model Additional Protocol in 1997 to expand its inspection rights, Washington has been its strongest champion, encouraging widespread adoption. The only exception to this standard was India, which received a customized limited protocol in recognition of its status as a nuclear weapon state outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Due to geopolitical instability in West Asia and a traditional reliance on fossil fuels for power generation, the region accounts for just five of the world’s 417 operational nuclear reactors. Four of these are in the United Arab Emirates and one in Iran. The vast majority of global nuclear capacity remains concentrated in North America, Europe, Russia, East Asia, and South Asia.

The US-UAE nuclear agreement, which enabled the UAE to build four reactors, came into force in December 2009. It is widely regarded as the non-proliferation gold standard because the UAE voluntarily renounced domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

Why has Saudi Arabia insisted on the right to enrich uranium?

Like the UAE, Saudi Arabia initially wanted to rely on nuclear energy to conserve its oil reserves, which were being consumed to meet soaring domestic electricity and desalination demands. The kingdom plans to construct 16 reactors by 2030 to generate 17 gigawatts of capacity, aiming to supply 20 percent of its electricity requirements. Formal talks with the US began in 2008 under a Memorandum of Understanding that relied on international fuel supplies.

However, as Iran expanded its own domestic enrichment infrastructure, Saudi Arabia shifted its position, insisting on the right to enrich its own uranium. No progress was made during the Obama administration, which insisted that Riyadh accept a zero-enrichment gold standard agreement. While the first Trump administration took a flexible approach, talks stalled after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declared in 2018 that although the kingdom does not want to acquire a nuclear bomb, it would without a doubt follow suit as soon as possible if Iran developed one.

Saudi Arabia floated a global commercial tender in 2017-18 for the construction of nuclear reactors. The tender drew bids from the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, and France, with the Chinese bid reported to be up to 20 percent cheaper than its competitors. However, Riyadh decided not to award the contract, as it did not wish to jeopardize its strategic relationship with the US and instead used the pending deal as leverage to pressure Washington into accepting a framework that allows for domestic uranium enrichment.

Why has the Trump administration changed course?

President Trump’s choice of Saudi Arabia as his first foreign destination of his second term, combined with the return visit of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington in November 2025, where he promised to invest $1 trillion in the US, gave the Saudis fresh hope of securing a deal that includes domestic uranium enrichment capability. With the ongoing war with Iran, the Trump administration views anchoring Saudi Arabia to the US geopolitical sphere as an urgent national security priority. Hence the conclusion of the deal at this time, which, according to media reports, provides for a joint study to explore the viability of a domestic black box enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, as well as a bilateral safeguards agreement between the two sides.

Why are experts and US lawmakers concerned?

The powerful non-proliferation lobby is deeply unhappy that the US is abandoning its longstanding policy of denying enrichment and reprocessing technologies to non-nuclear weapon states. Historically, the only exceptions to this policy were Japan and EURATOM, both strictly subject to IAEA additional protocol inspections. Serious concerns have been expressed by Democrats and key Republican senators. Chief among them is the potential rise of a radical regime in Saudi Arabia that would inherit a functional domestic uranium enrichment infrastructure.

Additionally, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar may feel compelled to follow suit, leading to a West Asian nuclear arms race. Non-proliferation advocates also question how the US can credibly prevent Russia, China, and France from offering sensitive enrichment technologies to other states in the future if Washington erodes its own standard. As a damage control exercise, Trump remarked on Truth Social that there will be no enrichment of material, which is true as the agreement in its present form only establishes a joint study. He added that the agreement will be totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.

The nuclear agreement is expected to be delivered to both the Senate and the House soon. After a review period of 90 days, with both chambers in continuous session, the agreement will automatically take effect unless both houses pass a joint resolution of disapproval with a two-thirds majority, which is unlikely. Saudi Arabia, however, will not join the Abraham Accords to normalize its relations with Israel unless an irrevocable path to Palestinian statehood is agreed upon. Therefore, Trump will likely soften his self-imposed political conditions rather than jeopardize a major strategic and economic alliance.

What could the deal mean for the global non-proliferation regime?

Israel will be most affected by the deal if it goes through without a diplomatic rapprochement with the Saudis. However, it will fight fiercely to ensure that the joint study does not lead to the establishment of a domestic enrichment capability in Saudi Arabia, a decision that will be taken by the next US administration. The UAE, managing its own complex relations with Saudi Arabia, is likely to invoke the most favored nation clause in its nuclear agreement to have its own enrichment facility if and when the US moves to permit such a facility on Saudi soil.

For Iran, the Saudi deal will bolster its negotiating position with the US to reinforce its own right to enrichment, which the US seems to have tacitly conceded. Turkey remains secure under the NATO nuclear umbrella, and Egypt is currently engaged with Russia in constructing its first nuclear reactor, which precludes domestic enrichment under a specific take-back framework for spent nuclear fuel. While the agreement marks a significant victory for Saudi Arabia if it proceeds without any formal linkage to the Abraham Accords, from the perspective of regional and global stability it would be prudent if the two year joint study ultimately rules out domestic uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia.

This article is based on analysis by Ambassador R Swaminathan, former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, former Ambassador to Egypt, and former Permanent Representative to the Arab League.